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The present paper uses survey data on expected consumer price developments to analyse
the role of inflation expectations in the inflation process. The survey measures of price ex-
pectations are derived from the European Commission’s Consumer Survey and from the
surveys of professional experts conducted by the London-based institute Consensus Eco-
nomics. The estimates of the New Keynesian inflation model presented here underscore the
importance of inflation expectations for the short to medium-run development of consumer
prices in Germany, France and Italy. Furthermore, the analysis of the process of expectati-
ons formation indicates that the expectations of the households and experts surveyed are
strongly guided by earlier forecasts and past price developments. The resultant “stickiness”
of the inflation process heightens the need for monetary policy makers to adopt a forward-
looking approach.
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Die vorliegende Arbeit verwendet Umfragedaten zur erwarteten Preisentwicklung, um die
Rolle der Inflationserwartungen im Inflationsprozess zu analysieren. Dabei konzentriert
sich die Analyse auf die im Rahmen der EU-Verbraucherumfrage ermittelten Daten und die
von Consensus Economics erhobenen Expertenprognosen für Deutschland, Frankreich und
Italien. Die präsentierten Schätzungen des neukeynesianischen Inflationsmodells un-
terstreichen die Bedeutung der Inflationserwartungen für die kurz- bis mittelfristige Ent-
wicklung der Konsumentenpreise. Ferner deutet die Analyse des Erwartungsbildungspro-
zesses darauf hin, dass sich die befragten Haushalte und Experten bei der Erwartungsbil-
dung stark von früheren Prognosen und von der vergangenen Preisentwicklung leiten las-
sen. Die daraus resultierende Persistenz inflationärer Prozesse verstärkt die Notwendigkeit
eines vorausschauenden Verhaltens der geldpolitischen Entscheidungsträger.Table of contents
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I. Introduction
There is a broad consensus among theoreticians and practitioners of central banking alike
that inflation expectations play a key role in shorter-term price developments and in the
effectiveness of monetary policy. This consensus is born of the realisation that expectations
regarding future price developments enter into the decisions taken by economic agents and
are thus themselves part of the process of price formation. This connection is especially
striking when we look at price formation on the labour markets, where wages are negoti-
ated with future inflation developments in mind.
Central banks, whose main task is to maintain price stability, therefore have a vested inter-
est in observing and analysing private sector inflation expectations. However, empirical
studies of the role of expectations in the inflation process are only possible if reliable ob-
servations of market players’ inflation expectations are available. One way to solve this
problem is to ask economic agents directly what they expect. That way, observations may
be obtained which are not prejudiced by certain a priori assumptions. The quality of such
survey data, however, hinges crucially on the phrasing of the questions, the size of the
sample and the motives of the respondents.
In the United States, the use of survey data on price expectations obtained as part of the
Michigan, Livingston and ASA-NBER surveys has a long tradition.
1 By contrast, compara-
ble data from surveys conducted in the member states of the European Union have been
little used so far. The present paper tries to fill this gap by studying the information content
of survey data on expected price developments from the European Commission’s Con-
sumer Survey and from the survey of professional experts conducted by the London-based
institute Consensus Economics. The group of participants, the exact wording of the ques-
tions and the method of transforming the qualitative EU data into quantitative inflation
expectations are all described in detail in Chapter 2 of this paper.
In Chapter 3, the time series calculated from the Consensus Forecasts and the EU survey
data are used to study the role of inflation expectations in the inflation process. The theo-
                                           
∗  I wish to thank the following people for valuable comments and suggestions: Heinz Herrmann, Bettina Lan-
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workshops at the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Österreichische Nationalbank. Naturally, all remaining er-
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1 An overview of this literature is given in Thomas (1999).
12
retical foundation for this analysis is provided by Taylor’s (1979, 1980) model of staggered
contracts and its extension by Fuhrer/Moore (1995). These models create a link between
inflation, inflation expectations and real economic activity known as the “New Keynesian
Phillips Curve”, which has, over the past few years, become a standard feature of many
macro models. Since the time horizon of the survey data matches the time horizon of the
New Keynesian inflation model, the data may be used directly for an empirical review of
the model without any further critical assumptions being necessary.
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 underscores the important role inflation
expectations play in shorter-term price developments. This turns the spotlight on the issue
of what determinants economic agents rely on when forming expecations. In Chapter 4, the
survey data are therefore used to test alternative models of expectations formation. Owing
to its outstanding importance in macroeconomic theory, I first test the validity of the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis as defined by Muth. While the survey expectations pass the
standard test of unbiasedness, further tests indicate that at least part of the households and
experts surveyed did not make efficient use of the information available at the time they
formed their expectations. In order to find out how far the survey data deviate from the
benchmark of perfectly rational expectations, I then formulate and estimate a model of
partly rational, partly adaptive expectations. Chapter 5 summarises the findings and dis-
cusses their monetary policy implications.3
II. Description of the survey data used
II.1. Survey data as a measure of expected price developments
Anyone wishing to test the importance of inflation expectations for the inflation process
empirically faces the underlying problem that economic agents’ expectations are non-
observable variables; suitable strategies for quantifying these variables must first be found.
One approach to solving this problem consists in specifying a model for the inflation proc-
ess and then solving this model on the basis of a given expectations formation hypothesis.
In this case, however, the results are obviously not independent of whatever expectations
formation model has been chosen. For its part, an empirical test of alternative models of
expectations formation is possible only if direct observations exist for the expectations of
the economic agents in question.
2
Several authors have therefore attempted to derive market players’ inflation expectations
from financial asset prices (especially the term structure of interest rates and the prices of
interest-rate derivatives).
3 However, the derivation is based on certain non-testable as-
sumptions regarding the level and the structure of ex ante real interest rates. This seriously
impairs the information content of the expectations calculated in that manner.
4 Alterna-
tively, one can ask market participants directly what their expectations are over a certain
time horizon through a survey. The advantage of direct surveys is that they yield observa-
tions of inflation expectations which are not prejudiced by certain a priori assumptions.
However, the quality of the survey data hinges crucially on the size of the sample, the
wording of the questions and the motives of those surveyed.
The European Union member states have a number of surveys at their disposal which also
contain information on expected price developments. They include, in particular, the con-
sumer surveys carried out on behalf of the European Commission, the surveys of profes-
sional experts conducted by the London-based institute Consensus Economics, and the
ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.
5 Unlike the ECB survey, the EU and Consensus
Economics surveys have been carried out since the beginning and end of the eighties, re-
spectively, which means the number of observations is sufficient for analytical purposes.
The following two sections describe how the EU survey data and the Consensus Forecasts
                                           
2 Cf. Pesaran (1989), p. 207.
3 For more see ECB, Monthly Bulletin, May 2000, pp. 37-55, or also Mylonas/Schich (1999).
4 Pesaran (1989, p. 210) therefore calls these types of calculations “theory-loaded implicit methods” and
notes: “such ‘implicit’ methods of the measurement of inflation expectations are, however, only as good as
the theory and the auxiliary assumptions that underlie them”.
5 There are also a host of country-specific surveys. In Germany, one example is the Centre for European
Economic Research (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, or ZEW). The inflation expectations
gathered by ZEW cover a forecast horizon of six months and are based on a survey of around 350 financial
experts from banks, insurance companies and selected business firms.4
may be used to derive measures of expected price developments for a uniform time horizon
of twelve months. The forecast horizon of one year is of particular interest in this paper
since models of the inflation process which ascribe a prominent role to inflation expecta-
tions are usually geared to this time horizon (see Chapter 3).
II.2. The EU Consumer Survey of expected price developments
In the European Union member states, a harmonised consumer survey, which also includes
an assessment of past and future price developments, is conducted monthly. The surveys
are carried out by national institutions, such as the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung
(GFK) in Germany. Each country’s sample comprises at least 1,500 persons selected by a
special procedure. For the larger countries — France, Italy, Spain and the United King-
dom — the sample size was increased to 2,000, and for Germany to 2,500. Although the
survey has been conducted in this form since 1980, results from these surveys have only
been available since 1985 owing to database problems at the EU Commission. For those
member countries who entered the EU at a later date (Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland),
the sample period shortens accordingly.
The EU survey is not designed to yield exact quantitive forecasts but takes the form of a
tendency survey in which the respondents may choose from among several categories of
responses. Table 1 shows the exact wording of the questions and the categories of re-
sponses available. The terms A’, B’, etc. denote the percentages of the respondents in each
response category. Owing to the large sample size and the selection criteria applied by the
polling institutes, it may be assumed that the basket of goods relevant for the surveyed
households more or less corresponds to the basket of goods of the average household used
by statistical offices to measure consumer price movements. The survey data may thus be
interpreted as an assessment of the direction of change of the respective national consumer
price index.
6
An argument in favour of gathering qualitative rather than quantitative data is that the sur-
veyed households are more likely to have an opinion on the expected direction of future
price changes than they are to give precise forecasts for a certain time horizon.
7 This ad-
vantage is offset somewhat, however, by the fact that the object of the study often requires
a quantification of the survey results which, in turn, is only possible under certain assump-
tions, some of which may not be testable.
8 To convert the qualitative EU data into
                                           
6 Cf. Reckwerth (1997), p. 13f.
7 For more on this see Pesaran (1989), p. 210.
8 At the microeconomic level it is also possible to work directly with ordinal responses. Nerlove (1983) may
be regarded as a pioneer in this field. However, the use of ordinal measures of expectations in conven-5
Table 1: Questions and response categories of the EU Consumer Survey on price
developments
How, in your view, have prices moved during the
past 12 months?
How, in your view, will prices move in the coming
12 months?
Fallen slightly (A‘) Fall slightly (A)
Hardly changed (B‘) Stay roughly the same (B)
Risen slightly (C‘) Rise less sharply than before (C)
Risen moderately (D‘) Rise by roughly the same amount as before (D)
Risen sharply (E‘) Rise more sharply than before (E)
Don’t know (F‘) Don’t know (F)
absolute expected values for future price movements, I apply the method described by
Reckwerth (1997) which goes back to the distribution function approach developed by
Carlson and Parkin (1975) and its extension to the case of five categories by Batchelor and
Orr (1988).
9
Generally speaking, the distribution function approach developed by Carlson and Parkin is
based on the assumption that every respondent forms a subjective probability distribution
with a density function for the expected change in the price index to which he/she gears
his/her response. It is further assumed that an aggregate density function for all respondents
can be derived from the subjective density functions. The last step needed in order to con-
vert the response percentiles into the expected rate of inflation is to specify a concrete dis-
tribution function. With the central limit theorem in mind, it is usually assumed that the
aggregated density function follows a normal distribution or a logistic distribution. Since
earlier studies have shown that both alternatives lead to very similar results, I choose a lo-
gistic distribution for computational convenience.
10 For a given distribution, corresponding
areas under the graph of the aggregated density function (or values of the cumulative den-
sity function) can be assigned to the percentage shares of respondents in the individual re-
sponse categories; these reflect the corresponding probabilities.
11 The expected value of the
                                                                                                                                   
tional, aggregated time series models is extremely time-consuming, if not impossible altogether; therefore,
qualitative data generally need to be quantified for studies of this type.
9 See Reckwerth (1997), pp. 11-14. By contrast, the regression approach proposed by Pesaran is better suited
to the enterprise survey data he uses. Cf. Pesaran (1989), p. 221 ff. and Batchelor/Orr (1988), p. 322.
10 Cf. Lahiri/Dasgupta (1992) and Reckwerth (1997), p.15f.
11 As is common practice, the responses in the category “Don’t know” are distributed proportionally among
the other categories.6
density function calculated in that manner may then be interpreted as the mean rate of in-
flation expected by the respondents.
However, the quantification of the price expectations from the EU survey is complicated by
the fact that the wording of the response categories C, D and E - “rise less sharply than be-
fore”, “rise by roughly the same amount as before”, “rise more sharply than before” - links
the respondents’ assessment of expected future price developments to their perception of
price movements in the more immediate past (presumably during the past 12 months). In
terms of the conversion method, this means that the mean expected inflation rate Etπ t+12 is
the product of the (mean) assessment of price developments over the past 12 months,  1 −′t π ,
and a factor xt (calculated using the cumulative density function) which reflects the change
in the assessment of  future relative to past price developments:
12
(1)  t t
e
t x 1 12 − + ′ = π π
This raises the question as to what variable should be used to measure the perceived past
rate of price increases,  1 −′t π . An obvious solution would be to use the assessment of past
price trends which was culled in the first part of the question.
13 However, quantification of
these data is further complicated by the fact that the response categories C’, D’ and E’ refer
to the assessment of past price trends in relation to a benchmark considered “moderate”.
Developing equation (1), this link may be expressed as:
(2) 1 1 1 − − − ′ = ′ t
m
t t x π π
where  1 − ′t x  reflects the assessment of past price trends relative to the rate of price rise con-
sidered to be moderate by the average respondent. In order to be able to evaluate the re-
sponses to this part of the question, one therefore needs additional information as to what
respondents consider a moderate rate of inflation. Since such information is not available
and other conceivable methods of determining the “moderate” rate of inflation require ad-
ditional critical assumptions, this approach will not be pursued further here.
14 Instead, I
shall assume that the assessment of past price developments by the households surveyed
matches the actual rate of change of the respective national consumer price index over the
past twelve months (i.e.  1 1 − − = ′ t t π π ).
15 This assumption appears fairly unproblematical
                                           
12 The precise method of deriving this term is described in Reckwerth (1997), p. 56 ff.
13 Batchelor/Orr (1988) and Reckwerth (1997) choose this approach.
14 Batchelor/Orr (1988) use a complicated method to determine the moderate rate of inflation; this method
requires, inter alia, quantifying the “natural” rate of inflation. For more see Batchelor/Orr (1988),
p. 322f.
15 Simmons/Weiserbs (1992) and Berk (1997, 2000) use this approach.7
since the rate of change in the consumer price index is a variable which is measured
monthly and published on a timely basis in the countries under observation.
Figure 1 shows the pattern of the expected price changes, quantified on the basis of current
CPI inflation, for the five largest euro-area members and for the euro area as a whole
(EMU-11). To construct the euro-area series, I weighted the contributions of the individual
countries with their 1999 percentage shares in overall euro-area consumer expenditure.
16 In
the charts, the inflation expectations formed in t-12 are contrasted with the actual (year-on-
year) rates of CPI change in t. The difference between the two series at time t accordingly
shows the “forecast” error. At first glance, the inflation expectations derived from the sur-
vey data seem to distinctly trail behind actual price developments. Thus, the surveyed
households systematically underestimated inflation during the period of accelerating price
increase up to mid-1991 but then distinctly overestimated it during the period of decelerat-
ing price increase between mid-1992 and mid-1993. Since March 1999, inflation expecta-
tions have been rising virtually parallel to currently observable price developments. How-
ever, it should be noted that the downward trend in the inflation rate between mid-1993 and
the beginning of 1999 was anticipated correctly. This would indicate that not only a back-
ward-looking component but also other explanatory factors play a role in the formation of
expectations.
Despite the fact that the EU Consumer Survey is supposed to be harmonized across all
participating countries, the wording of the questions and the response categories in France
and Spain displays some peculiarities which need to be taken into account when quantify-
ing the data gathered there and using them for analytical purposes. For example, the sur-
veyed French households are asked for their assessment of expected price developments
“in the coming months” without this time period being specified more precisely (see Table
A1 in the Annex). To keep things simple, Figure 1 assumes that French households’ re-
sponses relate to a time horizon of one year, just like those of the other countries. Since the
first part of the question, however, refers to the assessment of price trends in the past six
months (again different from the other countries), one cannot rule out the possibility that
some of the respondents will likewise relate the question concerning future price develop-
ments to that time horizon. The danger that the price expectations calculated from the EU
survey are subject to a measurement error is consequently greater for France than for the
other countries. In Spain, the response category “rise by roughly the same amount as be-




t x 1 12 − + = π π  (see Table A2 in the
Annex). It is not clear (at least to us) what the surveyed households are supposed to
                                           
16 Because they joined the EU at a later stage, Finland and Austria are only included in the aggregate from
mid-1997.8
Figure 1: Price expectations according to EU Consumer Survey
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understand by “prices rising rather sharply”. However, the fact that the category “risen
moderately” (D’) is likewise replaced by the formulation “risen rather sharply” – ergo,
1 1 1 − − − ′ = ′ t
rs
t t x π π  - enables us to derive a proxy for this variable from the responses to this
part of the question. If we once again assume that the surveyed households correctly assess
past price developments (i.e.  1 1 − − = ′ t t π π ), the price rise considered to be “rather sharp” at
that particular point in time can be calculated by dividing the measured inflation rate by the
distribution term x´.
II.3. Consensus Forecasts for consumer prices
A potential weakness of consumer and business surveys is that there might be little eco-
nomic incentive for the respondents to state their expectations correctly. Some critics there-
fore recommend to restrict attention to surveys of professional forecasters who also sell
their forecasts on the market.
17 However, other authors point out that it is precisely the pro-
fessional forecasters who may have strategic incentives to report forecasts that deviate from
their “true” expectations.
18
Since the autumn of 1989, the London-based firm Consensus Economics has been con-
ducting a survey at the beginning of each month in which renowned experts are asked to
give their forecasts for the development of a range of important macroeconomic variables
in over 20 countries. For each of the seven largest industrial countries (United States, Ja-
pan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Canada), a separate panel of profes-
sional forecasters is recruited from the major banks, investment firms, economic research
institutes and other business services in that country.
19 Since the end of 1994, the group of
countries having their own expert panels has been enlarged to include the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Norway. For numerous other countries, including all other
euro-area countries, Consensus Economics collects forecasts based on information pro-
vided by a number of leading economic forecasters.
With regard to the construction of time series, the usefulness of the regular monthly Con-
sensus Forecasts is limited by the fact that the forecasts are made for the current year and
the following year and thus do not have a fixed forecast horizon. However, once every
quarter Consensus Economics asks the country panellists to provide additional estimates
                                           
17 Cf. Keane/Runkle (1990), p. 715.
18 Cf. Lamont (1995).
19 In Germany, 26 institutions are surveyed at present (in France: 17, in Italy:13, in Spain: 10, in the Nether-
lands: 9): DG Bank, BHF Bank, Deutsche Bank Research, DGZ Deka Bank, JP Morgan, MM Warburg,
WGZ Bank, Bank Julius Baer, BfG Bank, Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, Invesco Bank, RWI Essen, Sal
Oppenheim, Bayerische LBank, FAZ Institut, HypoVereinsbank, Bankgesellschaft Berlin, Helaba Frank-
furt, IW Cologne, DIW Berlin, HSBC Trinkaus, IFO Munich, IfW Kiel, Merrill Lynch, Westdeutsche
LBank.10
for each of the following six (or sometimes even seven) quarters. These “quarterly consen-
sus forecasts” include estimates of real growth, real consumption expenditure and indus-
trial output as well as forecasts of the (year-on-year) rates of change in each national con-
sumer price index. The published forecasts are the respective arithmetical means of the
panellists’ individual forecasts, which are not published separately. Table 2 shows the re-
sults of the December 11, 2000 survey regarding the expected development of consumer
prices in Germany.
Table 2: Quarterly forecasts of the rate of change in consumer prices for Germany as
at December 11, 2000
20
Quarterly Consensus Forecasts
Percentage Change (year-on-year). From Survey: December 11, 2000
2000 2001 2002
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Consumer
Prices 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.5
Consensus Forecasts shown in bold italics
The quarterly Consensus Forecasts are available for Germany, France and Italy from No-
vember 1989 and for Spain and the Netherlands from December 1994. These data can be
used to construct time series of the price developments expected by the surveyed experts
for fixed time horizons of between one and six quarters. Figure 2 shows the pattern of in-
flation forecasts with a horizon of four quarters relative to actual price developments. In
contrast to Figure 1, the rates shown here are quarterly averages, which explains the stead-
ier path of the series.
21 Since the sample period of the forecasts for Spain and the Nether-
lands, at 25 observations, is too short for an empirical investigation of the issues to be pur-
sued in this paper, the analyses conducted below focus on the survey data for Germany,
France and Italy.
One striking feature is that the professional experts polled by Consensus Economics failed
to anticipate either the deceleration of inflation in the first half of the nineties or the further
sharp slowing of inflation rates in the run-up to European monetary union. The tendency to
overestimate the actual rate of price increases was particularly marked in the case of France
                                           
20 See: Consensus Economics, Consensus Forecasts, December 2000, p. 8.
21 In 1990 (1991) the country panellists were asked to provide additional forecasts for individual quarters as
part of the February (March), July and November surveys. In 1992 and 1993, the quarter-by-quarter fore-
casts were part of the February, May, August and November surveys, and since the beginning of 1994, they
have been included in the March, June, September and December surveys. In Figure 2, the two missing ob-
servations for the second quarter of 1990 and 1991 were approximated by interpolating the preceding and
succeeding “observation”.11
Figure 2: Consensus Forecasts of consumer prices in four quarters
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but can also be observed clearly in the forecasts for Germany, especially at the turn of 1998
to 1999. Nor was the most recent turning point in price trends predicted correctly, which
was, however, caused by exogenous factors (the oil price shock).
In order to compare the predictive power of the Consensus Forecasts with that of the EU
survey data, use may be made of statistical measures such as the mean absolute forecast
error, the root mean square error or Theil’s inequality coefficient, which gives the forecast
error relative to the static forecast (“no change in the inflation rate”). Table 3 summarises
the values of these measures for the survey data considered here. It indicates that the mean
absolute forecast error of the Consensus Forecasts for Germany and Italy was smaller than
the corresponding figure for the consumer price expectations polled in Germany and Italy.
By contrast, in the case of France the expert forecasts show a larger absolute forecast error
than the price expectations calculated from the consumer survey. This is confirmed by the
values of the other two measures. As indicated by the values of Theil’s inequality coeffi-
cient, the Consensus Forecasts for Germany and Italy outperform the naive extrapolative
forecast, whereas the forecast error of the French experts corresponds exactly to that of the
“no change” forecast. Of all forecasts considered here, only the price expectations of the
Italian households surveyed, whose forecast error even exceeds that of the naive extrapola-
tive forecasts, perform worse than the Consensus Forecasts for France.
Table 3: Comparison of predictive power
Estimation period: 4
th qtr of 1990 to 4
th qtr of 2000
Price expectations according to Germany France Italy




























1) Forecast error of the survey data relative to the naive extrapolative forecast (Etπ t+4=π t-1). Values smaller
than unity imply that the forecasts of the surveyed households and experts outperform the naive extrapolative
forecast.13
III. Inflation expectations as a determinant of inflation
III.1. The New Keynesian model of the Phillips curve
There is a broad consensus among economic scholars and monetary policy makers alike
that private-sector inflation expectations play a key role in the monetary transmission proc-
ess.
22 However, there is still no agreement on the exact nature of that process. Consensus
exists only insofar as most economists and central bankers share the view that, in the long
run, inflation is a monetary phenomenon whereas the influence of monetary policy on the
real economy is limited to the short to medium term.
Most approaches to explaining the short to medium-run dynamics of inflation are based on
the trade-off between (wage) inflation and unemployment described by Phillips (1958).
23
The realisation that wage bargainers negotiate expected real wages led Friedman (1968)
and Phelps (1967) to add an expectational component to the original Phillips curve. The
core argument of the Friedman-Phelps model is that there is a trade-off between inflation
and unemployment only as long as private-sector inflation expectations deviate from the
actual rate of inflation. Newer models stress the importance of temporary wage and price
rigidities and try to come up with an explicit microfoundation of the Phillips-curve rela-
tionship. Among these, the groundbreaking models of staggered wage/price contracts pro-
posed by Taylor (1979, 1980) and Calvo (1983) as well as Rotemberg’s (1982) model of
quadratic price adjustment costs deserve special mention.
Whereas Calvo’s and Rotemberg’s models describe enterprises’ price-setting behaviour in
a situation of monopolistic competition, Taylor derives the influence of expected price de-
velopments on the current price level from the existence of staggered wage contracts which
run for two or more periods. Since the data from the EU survey and the Consensus Fore-
casts are primarily suited to test the Taylor model, I will review the salient features of this
model before presenting empirical results.
24 In the most simple two-period version of the
Taylor model, it is assumed that all wage contracts have a duration of two periods and that
one-half of all contracts are renewed each period. Under these assumptions, the wage level
w prevailing in period t is the average of the contract wages x negotiated in t and t-1:
(3a) wx x tt t =+ − () / 1 2
                                           
22 See e.g. ECB (2000), p. 49.
23 Under the assumption that prices are set as a constant markup on wages, output prices will grow in propor-
tion to nominal wages.
24 The description of the model follows Roberts (1997), p. 175f..14
Furthermore, it is assumed that the contract wage negotiated in t depends on the price level
expected for the duration of the contract, on the expected unemployment rate u, on a con-
stant b0 and on a random shock ε t:
(3b) t o t t t t t t t b u E u p E p x ε γ + + + − + = + + ) ( 2 / ) ( 1 1
Equation (3b) may be interpreted as a “quasi” labour supply function. The model is closed
by the assumption that enterprises react to changes in nominal wages by adjusting prices
accordingly (mark-up pricing):
(3c) t t t t s h w p ν + + = ) (
The variable s is a proxy for all other factors relevant to enterprises’ pricing policies, such
as the price of crude oil and other commodity prices. Inserting (3a) and (3b) into (3c), and
solving for the rate of change in prices, ∆ p, gives the following price equation:
(4) () t t t t t t t t t t b s h u p E p E p ν ε ε γ 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ˆ
2
1
1 0 1 1 + + + + + − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − +
where  1 1 1 ˆ + − − + + + = t t t t t t t u E u E u u u . The lagged value of the expected rate of price change
is often subsumed into an expectational error term:
(4a) t t t t t t t t t b s h u p E p η ν ε ε γ + + + + + + − ∆ = ∆ − + 4 ) ( 2 4 ) ( 4 ˆ 2 1 0 1
where  η t stands for the expectational error  ) ( ) ( 1 1 t t t t t t p p E p p E − = ∆ − ∆ − − . It should be
noted, however, that the term η t has an expected value of zero only if expectations are un-
biased. Since this cannot be taken for granted, care must be taken when empirically testing
equation (4a) that a constant is included in the estimation.
Because the rate of unemployment, ut, is strongly serially correlated, it can be argued that
current unemployment is an adequate proxy for  t u ˆ . Owing to measurement problems and
to doubts regarding the constancy of the “natural” rate of unemployment, many more recent
studies replace the unemployment rate by the gap between actual and potential output. This
may be justified by appealing to Okun’s law, which postulates a fixed relationship between
the output gap and the deviation of the unemployment rate from its natural level. However,
even if Okun’s law is considered to have only limited validity, one may argue that wage
settlements in many cases depend more on the cyclical situation than on the level of the
unemployment rate. If one replaces the unemployment rate with the output gap, z=(y-15
y*)/y*, and summarises the “wage” shock ε , the “price” shock ν  and the expectational error
η  into a joint error term ε
π , one ends up with the prototype of the New Keynesian Phillips
curve:
(5)
π ε t t t t t t c s c z c p E p + + + + ∆ = ∆ + 0 2 1 1 ) (
In the past few years, this type of Phillips curve has become a standard feature of the dy-
namic microfounded IS-LM models which are widely used to evaluate alternative monetary
policy strategies.
25 However, under the assumption of rational expectations, equation (5)
implies that a - credibly announced - disinflation can be achieved at no real cost (or even,
that a gradual disinflation would actually be accompanied by an economic boom!).
26 This
flies in the face of the empirical observation that reducing high rates of inflation generally
involves sizable output losses, even in countries like Germany where the central bank tra-
ditionally enjoyed a high degree of credibility.
27 In empirically oriented studies the right-
hand side of equation (5) is therefore often augmented by one or more lags of the endoge-
nous variable:
(5a)
π ε δ δ t t t t t t t c s c z c p p E p + + + + ∆ − + ∆ = ∆ − + 0 2 1 1 1 ) ( ) 1 (
where 0 ≤  δ  ≤  1.
One possible explanation of the influence of past inflation on current price developments is
the existence of a backward-looking element in the formation of expectations. Thus,
Gali/Gertler (2000), using a Calvo model, assume that only a certain fraction of the entre-
preneurs form rational expectations, whereas the others set their prices based on simple,
purely backward-looking rules of thumb.
28 If one follows this interpretation, the expecta-
tions term in equation (5a) represents the forward-looking “rational” component of expec-
tations formation. Alternatively, some authors justify adding the lagged inflation rate to
equation (5) by the hypothesis that wage demands in period t are geared to real wages ne-
gotiated in period t-1 as well as the (real) wage agreements expected for t+1. The assump-
tion that relative wages - the wage structure - play a key role in wage negotiations goes
back as far as Keynes (1936) and has been taken up more recently by Buiter/Jewitt (1981)
and Fuhrer/Moore (1995).
29
                                           
25 See e.g. Clarida/Gali/Gertler (1999), McCallum/Nelson (1999a/b), Rotemberg/Woodford (1999) and vari-
ous other contributions published in Taylor (1999).
26 Cf. Mankiw (2000), p. 13.
27 For more see Ball (1994).
28 Cf. Gali/Gertler (2000), p. 12f.
29 Cf. Keynes (1936), p. 14. Ascari/Garcia (1999) try to derive this idea from first principles.16
Using survey data on market players’ inflation expectations, one may test directly whether
past inflation plays a role in the inflation process independently of inflation expectations.
Roberts (1995, 1997) and Rudebusch (2000) use survey data on price expectations of US
households as well as forecasts by professional experts to estimate the Phillips curve model
described by equation (5a) for the US economy. Whereas the evidence presented by Rob-
erts does not suggest that inflation is “intrinsically” sticky, Rudebusch comes up with a
point estimate of only 0.29 (and a 90 percent confidence interval of between 0.16 and 0.42)
for the parameter δ .
30 In the following, the survey data described above are used to estimate
the inflation model described by equation (5a) for Germany, France, and Italy.
III.2. Formulating the estimation equation
Since the average duration of wage agreements in the United States and Europe is between
one and two years, equation (5a) is usually interpreted as a model for price developments
over a time horizon of one year.
31 On the one hand, this means that we don’t have to “break
down” the price expectations calculated from the EU and the Consensus surveys into 6-
month or 3-month expectations but can use them directly to estimate equation (5a). On the
other hand, the discrepancy between the time horizon of the price variable and the sam-
pling interval of the data means that we have to find a way to deal with the problems
caused by overlapping observations. Some authors circumvent these problems by adapting
the data frequency to the time horizon of the variables in question.
32 However, since I can-
not afford to sacrifice three quarters of the available observations, this approach is out of
the question here. I therefore choose to estimate equation (5a) with quarterly data, which
means that the time horizon of the price variables amounts to four sampling intervals:
(6)
π ε δ δ t t t t t t t c s c z c p p E p + + + + ∆ − + ∆ = ∆ − + 0 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 ) ~ ( ~ ) 1 (
t z ~  and  t s ~  denote four-quarter averages of the variables in question (so that
() 3 2 1 25 . 0 ~
− − − + + + ⋅ = t t t t t z z z z z  etc.). To overcome the problems caused by the overlapping
nature of the observations, I apply the method proposed by Newey and West to calculate
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC-)consistent standard errors.
33
                                           
30 One reason for the difference in results may be that Roberts estimates equation (5a) for the annual and the
semiannual rate of change in the CPI, whereas Rudebusch estimates the model for quarterly inflation in the
GDP chain-weighted price index (although he uses survey data on inflation expectations which refer to the
rate of change in the CPI).
31 Cf. Rudebusch (2000), p. 4, and Svensson (1999) and Smets (2000). By contrast, an equation for the rate of
change in prices against the previous quarter can be better derived from a model of staggered wage con-
tracts with a contractual length of four or more periods. For more see Fuhrer/Moore (1995).
32 Roberts (1995) and Smets (2000) choose this route.
33 For an earlier attempt to deal with this problem, see Hansen and Hodrick (1980).17
To achieve consistency with the survey data, the rate of price changes in equation (6) is
measured by the respective national consumer price indices. The fact that the employees
(or their representatives) mainly have their eye on the expected development of consumer
prices when negotiating wages is another argument in favour of this choice. One must note,
though, that the price variable on the left-hand side of the mark-up equation (3c) is the
price level of domestically produced goods which, in an open economy, may evolve differ-
ently than the consumer price level.
34 When interpreting equation (6) as a model for con-
sumer price inflation, we therefore have to add the (relative) prices of imported consumer
goods to the list of exogenous variables that need to be included in  t s . In the following, I
use the rate of change of import prices relative to the rate of change of consumer prices
(∆ pim
r) as a summary statistic for the combined influence of the prices of imported raw
materials, intermediate products and consumer goods:
 35
(6a)
π ε δ δ t
r
t t t t
s
t t c pim c z c p p E p + + ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − + 0 4 2 1 4 4 2 4 4 1 4
~
The output gap in quarter t, zt=yt-yt*, is measured as the difference between (the log of)
real GDP and its long-term trend.
36 In order to estimate the trend, (the log of) real GDP is
regressed on time and time squared. The inclusion of a quadratic trend is one way of giving
the estimation an additional degree of freedom without having to specify a particular point
in time for the structural break.
37 In Figure 3 the results of these estimations are contrasted
with the output gaps estimated for Germany, France and Italy by the OECD, which, how-
ever, are only available on a biannual basis. As the comparison shows, the two series gen-
erally display a relatively similar pattern, despite some differences in the details.
                                           
34 The consumer price index (P
c) is composed of the prices of domestically manufactured and consumed con-
sumer goods (P
d) and the prices of imported consumer goods (E
.P
f), weighted by their respective shares in
consumer expenditure, (1-a) and (a). Consequently, the relationship between those variables’ rates of
change is:  ) ( ) 1 ( e p a p a p
f d c ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − = ∆  and.  ). 1 /( ) ( a p e p a p p
c f c d − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ = ∆
35 See Rich/Rissmiller (2000) for the significance of import prices for a relatively closed economy like the
United States.
36 See ECB, Potential output growth and output gaps: concept, uses and estimates, Monthly Bulletin, October
2000.
37 The question as to the appropriate trend specification for real output is still the subject of heated debate in
the literature. Assenmacher (1998) studies this question for GDP in the Federal Republic of Germany and
comes to the conclusion that German GDP did not display a stochastic trend since the Second World War
but was trend-stationary in the 1950-1995 estimation period, with structural breaks in 1961 and 1973.18


































III.3. Interpreting the estimation results
III.3.1. Estimation results based on Consensus Forecasts
One reason for using the expert forecasts collected by Consensus Economics to empirically
test the inflation model described by equation (6a) is that those forecasts are published,
media attention is devoted to them, and they are consequently an important source of in-
formation for wage bargainers. A decisive advantage of this source of information over the
forecasts of individual institutes or organisations is that the forecasts published by Consen-
sus Economics already represent the average values of a sizable number of individual fore-
casts which are based on different forecasting approaches and divergent assumptions re-
garding the development of key exogenous factors.
Table 4a summarises the results of the estimations conducted on the basis of the one-year-
ahead Consensus Forecasts of consumer price inflation. In order to allow for some delay in
the reaction of consumer prices to changes in the output gap and changes in import prices,
a nonoverlapping lag of both variables (dated t-4) was included in the estimation. In addi-
tion to the results for the individual countries, table 4a presents the results of an estimation
performed for an EMU-3-aggregate consisting of all three countries. For this purpose, the
national time series were aggregated on the basis of GDP shares for 1995 (calculated at
purchasing power parities), which are 0.425 for Germany, 0.292 for France and 0.283 for
Italy.
38 The estimates given in columns 2 to 5 are the results of OLS estimations. Since one
cannot rule out the existence of a simultaneity problem with regard to the contemporaneous
expectations, output gap and import price variables, I conducted additional instrumental
variables estimations, in which the variables in question were instrumented by their own
lagged values. The IV estimates (columms 6 to 9) barely differ from the OLS estimates,
however. The last line of the table contains the results of a test of overidentifying restric-
tions proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon, which confirms the validity of the instru-
ments used.
39
With adjusted coefficients of determination of between 82% and 95%, the explanatory
content of the approach is highly satisfactory. The coefficient of the expectations variable,
δ 1, is highly significant and is in all cases close to unity. By contrast, the coefficient of the
lagged inflation rate, δ 2, is in no case significantly different from zero and was therefore
restricted to zero. The P-values of this restriction are listed in the next-to-last line of the
table. Secondly, there are considerable country-specific differences in the transmission of
                                           
38 In 1995 the share of the three “major” countries in euro-area GDP, in terms of purchasing power parities,
was over 70 %.
39 See Davidson/McKinnon (1993), p. 235f.20
Table 4a: Estimation results based on Consensus Forecasts
Estimation equation:
π ε π δ π δ π t t t t t t t
s
t t c pim c pim c z c z c E + + ∆ + ∆ + + + + = − − − + 0 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 1 4 2 4 1
~ ~







































































































3) 0.89 0.83 0.90 0.95 0.87 0.82 0.88 0.94
AC(1)
4) 0.39 0.47 0.56 0.45 0.41 0.43 0.60 0.50
AC(5)
4) -0.16 -0.12 -0.38 -0.52 -0.11 -0.18 -0.40 -0.58
Restrict.,
P-values 0.64 0.83 0.05 0.60 0.29 0.48 0.58 0.50
Overid.,
P-values
5) 0.26 0.45 0.79 0.35
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%/10%) level; values in brackets denote the HAC-consistent stan-
dard errors.
1) Carried out because the discrepancy between the data frequency and the time horizon of the endogenous
variables may cause autocorrelation of the first to (at most) the fourth order. 2) The instruments used are
lagged values of the explanatory variables. 3) Adjusted coefficient of determination. 4) Autocorrelation coef-
ficient of the first and fifth orders (standard error according to Bartlett: 1/√ T, i.e. 0.16 for T = 40). 5) Test of
orthogonality of the residuals against the instruments used; see Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), p. 235 f.21
Table 4b: Estimation results for the relationship between inflation and inflation ex-
pectations based on Consensus Forecasts
Estimation equation
π ε t t t t t t
s
t t c pim c pim c z c z c p E p + + ∆ + ∆ + + + ∆ = ∆ − − + 0 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 1 4 4 4
~ ~ ) (
Quarterly data, estimation period: Q1 1990 to Q4 1999, estimation method:
Two Stage Least Squares
1), Newey-West correction of standard errors
2)
Germany France Italy
























3) 0.89 0.83 0.88
AC(1)
4) 0.45 0.48 0.60
AC(5)
4) -0.09 -0.16 -0.32
Validity of coefficient re-
striction, P-values
0.28 0.31 0.74




***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%/10%) level; values in brackets denote the HAC-consistent
standard errors.
1) The instruments used are lagged values of the explanatory values. 2) Carried out because the discrep-
ancy between the frequency of data and the time horizon of the endogenous variables may cause auto-
correlation of the first to (at most) the fourth order. 3) Adjusted coefficient of determination. 4) Auto-
correlation coefficient of the first and fifth orders (standard error according to Bartlett: 1/√ T, i.e. 0.16
for T = 40). 5) Test of orthogonality of the residuals against the instruments used.
output shocks to prices. Aggregation thus entails a loss of information, which may give rise
to a bias in the coefficient estimates of the aggregated equation (the so called aggregation
bias).
40 In the case at hand, though, the estimation results for the aggregated time series
                                           
40  As was shown by Theil (1954), an aggregation bias can only be avoided if either the parameters of the
disaggregated equations are identical or the countries’ shares in the aggregated variables remain constant22
generally seem to match the weighted average values of the country-specific coefficients.
Still, it would seem that caution is warranted with regard to the use of an aggregated infla-
tion model for Germany, France and Italy, at least until there are clear signs of a greater
convergence of national inflation processes.
To illustrate the extent of country-specific differences, for each country an additional ver-
sion of equation (6a) was estimated, in which the coefficient δ 1 was restricted to unity and
all non-significant coefficients with the exception of the constants were restricted to zero
(see Table 4b). The results indicate that consumer prices in Germany and France react to
changes in the output gap with a lag of one year, whereas a corresponding rise or fall in
capacity utilisation in Italy has its main impact on consumer prices before the year is out. In
addition, the point estimate of the coefficient c1 is considerably larger for Italy than the
corresponding values of the coefficient c2 for Germany and France. The rate of change of
import prices has the expected positive impact on inflation everywhere. The strength and
the timing of this effect likewise show certain national differences.
III.3.2. Estimation results based on EU survey data
In order to check the sensitivity of the results to the survey data used, the estimations were
repeated using the price expectations calculated from the EU survey. Bearing in mind the
wage contract model, an argument in favour of using these data is that they reflect the ex-
pectations of those economic agents who ultimately make the decisions on labour supply.
Table 5 summarises the estimation results for the inflation expectations calculated from the
EU survey data. With adjusted coefficients of determination of over 90%, the explanatory
power of the estimated equations is once again very high. However, this result is based
almost exclusively on the close relationship between current and expected price develop-
ments. While the coefficient of lagged inflation, δ 2, proves to be significantly positive in
the OLS estimation for Italy, it can be restricted to zero without any difficulty in the corre-
sponding IV estimation. The differences between the OLS and the IV estimates point to the
existence of an endogeneity problem. One possible reason for this problem could be that
the surveyed households’ assessment of future price developments is itself heavily depend-
ent on current price developments (for more on this see Chapter IV). The close correlation
between these two variables could also be the reason why the coefficients of the other ex-
planatory variables are in many cases non-significant. According to the results of the IV
estimations, the influence of the output gap variables on the current rate of inflation is only
significant in the estimations for Italy, but with a negative sign instead of the expected
                                                                                                                                   
over the entire period. In the present example apparently neither condition is met. See Wesche (1998), p.
59ff.23
Table 5: Estimation results based on EU survey data
Estimation equation:
π ε π δ π δ π t t t t t t t
s
t t c pim c pim c z c z c E + + ∆ + ∆ + + + + = − − − + 0 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 1 4 2 4 1
~ ~
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0.98 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.96 0.97
AC(1)
4) 0.24 0.15 0.49 0.15 0.28 0.20 0.52 0.18
AC(5)
4) -0.00 0.01 -0.42 -0.22 -0.04 -0.09 -0.16 -0.27
Restrict.,
P-values 0.68 0.55 - 0.65 0.47 0.14 0.18 0.94
Overid.,
P values
5) 0.42 0.35 0.33 0.98
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%/10%) level; values in brackets denote the HAC consistent stan-
dard errors.
1) Carried out because the discrepancy between the frequency of data and the time horizon of the endogenous
variables may cause autocorrelation of the first to (at most) the fourth order. 2) The instruments used are
lagged values of the explanatory values. 3) Adjusted coefficient of determination. 4) Autocorrelation coeffi-
cient of the first and fifth orders (standard error according to Bartlett: 1/√ T, i.e. 0.16 for T = 40). 5) Test of
orthogonality of the residuals against the instruments used; see Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), p. 235 f.24
positive sign. Moreover, only in the case of Germany and Italy can a significant influence
of (relative) import prices on consumer prices be demonstrated.
To sum up, it may be said that the estimation results presented here underscore the impor-
tance of expected price developments for current inflation. By contrast, I find no evidence
for a significant influence of last year’s inflation rate on current price developments. The
evidence presented here thus does not back the “sticky-inflation” model empasized by
Fuhrer and Moore (1992, 1995) which claims that lagged inflation plays an autonomous
role in the inflation process independently of the formation of expectations. Rather, the
results suggest that if we want to explain the high degree of inflation persistence to be ob-
served in the real world, we have to take a closer look at the way wage-setters form expec-
tations. This may be done by using the survey expectations to test alternative models of
expectations formation.25
IV. Determinants of inflation expectations
IV.1. Alternative models of expectations formation
The estimations presented in Chapter 3 support the hypothesis that private sector inflation
expectations constitute an important determinant of current inflation. However, we cannot
rule out the possibility that inflation expectations are for their part influenced by past price
developments. In order to understand the short-run dynamics of inflation, we therefore
need to know more about the process of expectations formation. This knowledge is not
only of theoretical interest but also has important practical implications for monetary pol-
icy. If the central bank does not succeed in anchoring inflation expectations at the desired
low level, it must combat the “excessive” expectations by pursuing a restrictive monetary
policy course. The attendant real costs in the form of output and employment losses would
then jeopardise the public acceptability of a monetary policy geared to price stability.
41
The spectrum of expectations formation models discussed in the literature ranges from
simple, purely backward-looking “rules of thumb” to explicitly modelling learning proc-
esses to the hypothesis of perfectly rational expectations.
42 Simple backward-looking mod-
els assume that agents use only past price developments and earlier forecast errors to form
expectations while other influences and relationships are disregarded. In his definition of
“rational expectations”, by contrast, Muth assumes that the subjective expectations of eco-
nomic agents match the predictions of the relevant economic theory.
43 Consequently, an
essential feature of Muth’s definition of rational expectations is that economic agents do
not make systematic errors.
The hypothesis that economic agents possess full knowledge of the relevant structural rela-
tionships is doubtless an extreme assumption that cannot be maintained outside the tran-
quillity of a prolonged steady state.
44 Many critics have pointed to the importance of in-
formation problems and have stressed the need to take into account the costs of making
optimal forecasts and also to explicitly model learning processes.
45 However, since its
adoption by Lucas (1972, 1973, 1975), Sargent (1973), Barro (1977) and others, the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis has become one of the broadly accepted paradigms of mac-
roeconomic analysis.
                                           
41 This is also called the “expectations trap”. For details see Christiano/Gust (2000).
42 For more see Pesaran (1989), chapters 2 and 3.
43 In Muth’s own words: “Expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially
the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory.” Muth (1961), p. 316.
44 Cf. Pesaran (1989), p. 2.
45 Among these critics are Akerlof/Yellen (1985a/b, 1987), Pesaran (1989), Ball (1991) and Ev-
ans/Honkapohja (2000).26
IV.2. Tests of unbiasedness and informational efficiency
The popularity of the rational expectations hypothesis has motivated numerous authors to
test it on survey data.
46 The tests conducted draw on certain properties of the expectations
errors,  t j t t t E π π η − − = , which must be met in a rational expectations scenario. Most im-
portantly, the expectations errors must have a mean value of zero and they must not be cor-
related with variables which were included in the agents’ information set Ω t-j at the time
the expectations were formed:
(7a) 0 ) ( = t E η (Criterion of unbiasedness)
(7b) 0 ) | ( = Ω − j t t E η (Criterion of orthogonality)
The property of unbiasedness may be tested by regressing the forecast error on a constant:
47
(8a) t t t t c E ε π π + = − − 0 4
If the constant c0 is significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis of unbiasedness
must be rejected. Table 6 summarises the results of this test for the Consensus Forecasts of
consumer prices and the price expectations calculated from the EU survey. Accordingly,
the null hypothesis of unbiasedness can only be rejected with a high level of confidence in
one case, namely for the Consensus forecasts of consumer price inflation in France. The
Consensus forecasts for Germany also display a certain bias; however, it is only significant
at the 10 % level. Unlike the mean forecast error of the experts for France, the average ex-
pectations error of the polled French households during the period under review was
greater than zero, which indicates that the surveyed consumers tended to underestimate
rather than overestimate the measured price rise. However, this bias could be due to a
measurement error resulting from the fact that French consumers were asked about their
expectations for the “coming months” without a more precise definition of the forecast
horizon.
Unbiasedness is merely one necessary condition for the Muth-rationality of expectations.
The second, stricter criterion requires the expectations errors to be orthogonal to the infor-
mation commonly available at the time expectations are formed. The orthogonality or in-
formational efficiency of the survey data can be tested by regressing the forecast error on a
                                           
46 Many of these studies make use of the Michigan and Livingston surveys of inflation expectations. See Rob-
erts (1997), Croushore (1998), Grant/Thomas (1999) and the older studies quoted there.
47 For more see Holden/Peel (1990), p. 124.27
Table 6: Are the forecast errors unbiased?
Estimation equation:      t t
s
t t c E ε π π + = − − 0 4
Quarterly data, estimation period: Q1 1991 to Q4 2000










c0=0, P-values 0.09 0.00 0.39







c0=0, P-values 0.997 0.05 0.41
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%/10%) level; values in brackets denote the HAC consistent
standard errors.
1) Carried out because the overlapping forecast errors cause autocorrelation of the residuals of (at most) the
fourth order.
range of variables which may have been of help in forecasting inflation at the time the
forecast was made:
(8b) t t t t t ßx E ε π π + = − − − 5 4
If ß is significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis of informational efficiency must
be rejected. However, it must be ensured that the vector x only contains variables which
were actually available to those polled at the time expectations were formed (“real-time
data”). Time series which are subject to major revisions after initial publication, such as
industrial output or gross domestic product, are therefore not admissible (unless real-time
data are still available). Here, I use the (unrevised) unemployment rates (national defini-
tions), the three-month national money market rates and the rates of change in the national
consumer price indices as elements of the vector x. All three variables are formulated as
year-on-year changes/rates of change. To allow for the possibility that lagged values of the
selected variables still contain information which is relevant to future price developments, I
included the most up-to-date values of these variables (dated t-5) as well as their respective
previous year’s values (dated t-9) in the estimation.28
Table 7: Are the forecast errors orthogonal to selected information variables?
Estimation equation:
t t t t t t t t
s
t t i ß i ß RU ß RU ß ß ß c E ε π π π π + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + + = − − − − − − − − 9 4 6 5 4 5 9 4 4 5 4 3 9 2 5 1 0 4
Quarterly Data, estimation period: Q1 1999 to Q4 2000
Estimation method: OLS, Newey-West correction of standard errors
Germany France Italy
Consensus Forecasts
ß=0, P-values 0.00 0.00 0.00
Price expectations according to the EU consumer survey
ß=0, P-values 0.00 0.046 0.00
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%/10%) level; values in brackets denote the HAC-consistent
standard errors.
1) Carried out because overlapping forecast errors cause autocorrelation of the residuals of (at most) the
fourth order.
As the results summarised in table 7 show, the null hypothesis of orthogonality must be
rejected for all of the survey data considered here. This evidence suggests that neither the
polled experts nor the surveyed households made efficient use of all the information avail-
able to them at the time the forecasts were made. Taken together, the results of the tests
conducted here are consistent with those for other survey data, namely that direct observa-
tions on expectations do not possess the properties implied by Muth’s definition of rational
expectations.
48
IV.3. Formulating a model of partly rational and partly adaptive expectations
This raises the question as to how the expectations formation process of the polled experts
and households differs from the benchmark of perfectly rational expectations. In the con-
text of the inflation model examined in chapter 3, some authors have recently worked with
the assumption that only a certain fraction of agents make forecasts which are optimal in a
statistical sense, whereas the others rely on simple, purely backward-looking rules of
thumb.
49 To motivate this assumption, one can draw on earlier work by Akerlof and Yellen
(1985a,b) who make the point that the additional utility of optimal forecasts compared with
an adaptive adjustment of expectations is likely to be small for many market participants. If
that is the case, adaptive expectations could be “near-rational” or even perfectly rational for
                                           
48 Examples include Baghestani (1992), Batchelor/Dua (1989) und Roberts (1997).
49 Roberts (1997, 1998) and Gali/Gertler (2000).29
those agents for whom the costs of obtaining and processing information exceed the addi-
tional utility of optimal forecasts.
50
Heterogeneity of this type can be represented by an expectations formation model which
contains both a forward-looking “rational” element and a backward-looking element which
captures the idea that agents update their expectations in the light of past forecast errors:
(9) )) ( )( 1 ( 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 t t t t t t
m
t t t E c E c E c E π π π π π − − + + − + − + =
4 + t
m
t E π  is the purely rational or “mathematical” expectation of future inflation, and the
coefficient c2 measures the speed at which agents revise their expectations. If c2 equals one,
the backward-looking element of equation (9) corresponds to the simplest form of an ex-
trapolative model of expectations formation (also known as the “naive” expectations for-
mation model). The empirical relevance of this model and the relative weight of the indi-
vidual elements can be tested using the available survey data. If one realistically assumes
that the rate of price change over the current period (pt–pt-1) is not known at the time ex-
pectations are formed, the lagged endogenous variable and the forecast error must be back-
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Following McCallum (1976), the “rational” expectation  4 + t
m
t E π  can be replaced by the
actual inflation rate in t+4 less an expectations error ν t+4:
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The drawback of the McCallum method is that it introduces an additional source of error,
ν t+4, which can have a negative impact on the accuracy of the estimation. To avoid the bias
which would result from the correlation between actual inflation in t+4 and the error term,
we must find suitable instruments for the future inflation rate. Since the expectations error
vt+4 is, by definition, uncorrelated with information already known in t or prior to t, a con-
sistent estimate of the parameters c1 and c2 can in principle be obtained by using lagged
values of the endogenous variable (Et-5π t-1, Et-6π t-2,..) and the inflation rate (π t-1, π t-2,..) as
instruments. However, the estimation of equation (9b) is further complicated by the poten-
tial presence of measurement error in the survey data which would introduce correlation
between the lagged endogenous variable and the disturbances. I therefore restrict the set of
                                           
50 Cf. Akerlof/Yellen (1985a). For the probable magnitude of losses see Haltiwanger/Waldman (1989) and
the article by Naish (1993), which also contains numerical examples.30
instruments to several lagged values of the inflation rate. Again, the P-values of the test of
overidentifying restrictions proposed by Davidson and McKinnon (1993) are shown sepa-
rately in the tables of results.
IV.4. Interpreting the estimation results
Table 8 summarises the estimation results for the Consensus Forecasts. With adjusted coef-
ficients of determination of between 0.80 and 0.89, the explanatory content of the approach
is again highly satisfactory. The estimates of the coefficient c1 are significantly positive in
all cases, with estimated values of between 0.13 and 0.47. The hypothesis of purely back-
ward-looking expectations (c1=0) must consequently be rejected (in the case of the fore-
casts for France, though, only at the 90% level of confidence). On the other hand, the esti-
mated share of the backward-looking element in the formation of expectations is greater
than 0.5 in all cases, so that the hypothesis of purely forward-looking expectations (c1=1)
must likewise be rejected at an even higher level of confidence. The evidence presented
here thus suggests that the polled experts draw on past price developments and earlier fore-
casts when forming their expectations but also incorporate other information into their cal-
culations.
The estimated values for the speed-of-adjustment coefficient c2 exhibit the expected posi-
tive sign. As regards the expectations formation of the experts for Italy, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the backward-looking element of expectations formation corresponds to
the “naive” extrapolative model (c2=1). By contrast, the experts on the panel for Germany
displayed much less sensitivity to past forecast errors. In their case, the hypothesis that c2
equals zero can only be rejected at the 90 % level of confidence. If we set c2 equal to zero,
the model of partly rational, partly adaptive expectations considered here reduces to the
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This specification suggests that economic agents only gradually adjust their forecasts in
response to new information. A “rational” reason for this kind of “forecast smoothing”
could lie in the considerable degree of uncertainty which generally surrounds the reliability
of newly released data and of the forecasting models used.
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51 See Deutsche Bundesbank (1998), Financial market prices as monetary policy indicators, Monthly Report,
July 1998, p. 57. Sill and Wrase (1999) formulate a model in which the lagged adjustment of expectations
occurs endogenously as the result of  Bayesian learning about the prevailing monetary policy regime.31
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Quarterly data, estimation period: Q1 1990 to Q4 1999
Estimation method: two-stage least squares
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R2bar 0.80 0.86 0.87 0.89
AC(1)
3) 0.77 0.64 0.66 0.72
AC(5)
3) -0.38 -0.71 -0.51 -0.62
AC(9)
3) 0.24 0.29 0.19 0.37
Test of overidentifying restrictions,
P-values
4)
0.42 0.22 0.30 0.88
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1 % (5 %/10 %) level; values in brackets denote the HAC-consistent
standard errors (Newey-West method).
1) The instruments used are lagged values (up to 12 lags) of the explanatory variables. 2) The Newey-West
correction is carried out because the data structure may cause autocorrelation of the first to (at most) the
eighth order. 3) The standard error according to Bartlett is 1/√ T, i.e. 0.17. for T equal to 36. 4) Test of or-
thogonality of the residuals against the instruments used; cf. Davidson/McKinnon (1993), p. 235f.
As a look at Table 9 shows, the results for the EU survey data tend to be even more hetero-
geneous than those for the forecasts gathered by Consensus Economics. In the equations
estimated for the polled German and French households, the coefficient of the forward-
looking element c1 assumes a significantly positive value, with estimated values of 0.22
and 0.30, respectively. By contrast, the null hypothesis of purely backward-looking expec-
tations cannot be rejected for the households polled in Italy. Furthermore, in the equation
estimated for the French households, a constant proves to be highly significant, indicating
that either a measurement error has occurred with respect to the level of the expectations
variable (which could have its roots in the conversion method, for instance) or that the
formulated model does not entirely capture the expectation formation process of the polled
households.32
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Quarterly data, estimation period: Q1 1991 to Q4 1999
Estimation method: two-stage least squares
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R2bar 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.91
AC(1)
4) -0.14 0.15 0.81 0.55
AC(5)
4) 0.14 0.01 0.29 0.15
AC(9)
4) -0.00 0.17 0.16 0.12
Test of overidentifying re-
strictions, P-values
3)
0.24 0.25 0.28 0.21
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1 % (5 /10 %) level; values in brackets denote the HAC-consistent stan-
dard errors (Newey-West method).
1) The instruments used are lagged values (up to 12 lags) of the explanatory variables. 2) The Newey-West
correction is carried out because the data structure may cause autocorrelation of the first to (at most) the
eighth order. 3) Test of orthogonality of the residuals against the instruments used; cf. Davidson/McKinnon
(1993), p. 235f. 4) The standard error according to Bartlett is 1/√ T, i.e. 0.17 for T equal to 36.
From a monetary policy perspective, the demonstration of a significant backward-looking
component in the formation of expectations is important because backward-looking ex-
pectations retard the speed at which monetary impulses are transmitted from aggregate de-
mand to prices. This point can be illustrated by drawing together the results of chapter 3
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lag it five periods, multiply the resulting expression by a factor α  and substract it from
equation (10a), we get an equation which expresses the rate of change in consumer prices
as a function of its own lagged value as well as the contemporary and lagged values of the
survey expecations:
(10b)
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By inserting equation (10c) into equation (10b), setting α  equal to 0.52 and rearranging
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The rather awkward lag structure is a consequence of the discrepancy between the data
frequency and the time horizon of the inflation rate and need not concern us here. Rather,
the derivation of equation (11) is meant to illustrate how a backward-looking, adaptive
element in expectations formation introduces persistence into the inflation process. The
point estimate of 0.68 for the sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation is very much in
line with the results presented by Roberts (2001) who estimates the partly forward-looking,
partly backward-looking version of the Phillips curve directly and finds that the weight on
lagged inflation is in the range of 0.5 to 0.7, with limited sensitivity to specification
choice.
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52 See Roberts (2001), S. 3.34
V. Summary and outlook
In summary, it may be said that the survey data used here, especially the forecasts collected
by Consensus Economics, have proved to be a promising instrument for analysing the in-
flation process and for testing alternative expectations formation hypotheses. While it can-
not be ruled out altogether that the price expectations reported by the surveyed households
and experts diverge from their “true” expectations, the tests performed during the instru-
mental variable estimations did not reveal any notable measurement problem. One limita-
tion of the analysis is certainly that it is based on a comparatively short time span. This is
especially true of the estimations based on the Consensus Forecasts, which have only been
gathered since autumn 1989. The results obtained can nevertheless be interpreted as useful
initial findings regarding the link between inflation and inflation expectations and the
structure of expectations formation in the countries under review.
The estimations of the New Keynesian inflation model presented here underline the im-
portance of inflation expectations for the short to medium-run development of consumer
prices. If the Consensus Forecasts are used as a measure of expected price developments,
the output gap and import prices likewise prove to be important determinants of the current
inflation rate. By contrast, the coefficient of the lagged inflation rate is not significantly
different from zero no matter which survey data are used. An important implication of this
finding is that backward-looking elements in expectations formation seem to be a more
promising explanation for inflation inertia than wage setters’ concern for relative real
wages.
In the last section of this paper, therefore, a model of partly rational and partly adaptive
expectations is formulated and estimated using the available survey data. We find that
expctations are neither purely forward-looking nor as unsophisticated as the simple adap-
tive expectations model would suggest, though the relative weight of the adaptive element
is in all cases greater than one half. This result backs the supposition of Akerlof/Yellen
(1985a/b) and others that many market participants rely on simple, purely backwards-
looking rules of thumb when forming their expectations. If the costs of acquiring informa-
tion and the uncertainty surrounding the reliability of available information are taken into
account, such behaviour, even by professional forecasters, may well be considered “ra-
tional”.
From a monetary policy perspective, the demonstration of backward-looking elements in
the formation of expectations is important because the associated persistence of inflation-
ary processes, once they have set in, reinforces the need for monetary policy makers to
adopt a forward-looking approach. This line of reasoning has recently been backed by a35
number of empirical studies which show that the optimal time horizon of monetary policy
decisions increases with the sluggishness of the inflation process.
53 Simulation studies
based on models with purely forward-looking expectations are therefore likely to underes-
timate the need for the central bank to act in a forward-looking manner and to overestimate
the stabilisation features of simple, purely backward-looking policy rules.
Conversely, evidence of a forward-looking component in the formation of expectations
also has important monetary policy implications. If at least a fraction of market participants
behave in a forward-looking manner, the efficacy of monetary policy measures depends on
those participants’ expectations regarding the goals and future course of central bank pol-
icy. In such an environment the central bank must do its utmost to convince market partici-
pants of its determination to adhere to a stability-oriented course. The tasks of clearly de-
fining the ultimate objective and announcing a comprehensible and transparent monetary
policy strategy play a key role in this context.
                                           
53 See, for instance, Batini/Haldane (1998) and Smets (2000).36
Annex
Tab. A1: Questions and response categories of the EU Consumer Survey on price de-
velopments in France
Do you think that over the past six months
prices have ...
Compared with current developments, do you
think that prices will ...
risen sharply  rise more sharply
risen moderately rise by the same amount as before
risen slightly  rise less sharply than before
hardly changed  remain stable
fallen slightly  fall slightly
don’t know don’t know
Tab. A2: Questions and response categories of the EU Consumer Survey on price de-
velopments in Spain
Would you say that, over the past 12 months,
prices have ...
Do you thank that in the next twelve months
prices will ...
risen very sharply  rise more sharply
risen rather sharply  rise rather sharply
risen slightly  rise more slowly
remained stable  remain stable
fallen slightly  fall slightly
don’t know don’t know37
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